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IN THE

SUPREl'~1E

COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of Utah, and
J. BRACKEN LEE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants~
vs.
THE ~IETROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT o~~ SALT LAKE
CITY, a corporation, and SALT
LAKE COUNTY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 9617

Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants
NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs brought this action to determine the
validity of taxes levied by defendant The Metropolitan
'Vater District of Salt Lake City for the year 1961,
and to secure a declaratory judgment relating to the
taxing power of said defendant under the statutes of
this state. Plaintiff .J. Bracken Lee also seeks recovery
of taxes paid under protest.
1
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DISPOSITION BEFORE LOWER COURT
On November 24, 1961, the court, upon the stipulation of the parties hereto, heard the case upon its
merits in connection with plaintiff's Order To Show
Cause why defendant The Metropolitan Water District
of Salt Lake City should not be restrained from disposing of the unappropriated cash surplus then in the
hands of said defendant. The lower court granted judgment for the defendants and held ( 1) the tax assessed
and levied by the defendant Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City on August 7, 1961, was valid,
(2) that the plaintiffs are not entitled to have any part
of the money paid by Salt I_.iake City to said defendant
for water sold and delivered to the City credited upon
or deducted from the taxes levied by said Metropolitan
Water District, and ( 3) that the defendant Metropolitan Water l)istrict may levy taxes in one year for
the purpose of carrying on the operations of the District during subsequent years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs-appellants seek the reversal of the
trial court's holdings as above enumerated and judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.

STATEl\iENT OF F.ACTS
The plaintiff Salt Lake City is, and was, a city
of the first class in the State of Utah at all times rna-

2
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terial to this lawsuit. The plaintiff J. Bracken Lee is,
and was, a resident taxpayer of Salt Lake City, Utah,
at all times rnaterial hereto and paid, under protest,
property taxes for 1961 levied against his residence at
2031 Laird i-\venue which included an amount of $10.99
levied by the 1\letropolitan Water District. (Exhibit
#4.) The defendant Metropolitan Water District of
Salt Lake City is, and at all times material herein was,
a corporation organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, having its
principal place of business in Salt Lake County. The
defendant Salt Lake County is a political subdivision
of the State of Utah and was charged with the responsibility of collecting taxes for the benefit of the Metropolitan Water District in 1961.
On the 7th day of August, 1961, the defendant
Water District adopted a resolution
levying taxes upon all taxable property within its corporate liinits which are conterminous with, and consist
of, the entire area of Salt Lake City, State of Utah,
at the rate of twenty-five cents on each $100.00 of
assessed valuation, which would result in revenue of
approximately $639,690.00 to the District. (Exhibit
#I, p. 7.) At the time this tax was levied, the Metro~
politan Water District had an unexpended, unappro~
priated cash surplus in excess of two million dollars.
(Paragraph 8 of the Answer, R. 2, Paragraph 5 of
Defendants' Findings of Fact, R. 83, and Statement
of Income and Retained Revenues for Years Ended
December 31, 1960 and 1959, as set forth on page 4
~Ietropolitan

3
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of Exhibit 3.) The Statement of Income and Retained
Revenues of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City (Exhibit 3, page 4) reveals that its total
income from operations for the year ended December
31, 1959, amounted to $873,853.07, and that its total
operating expenses for the same period amounted to
only $289,508.68, leaving a net income from operations
of $584~344.39 to •which were added tax revenues of
$611~928.21 and interest income of $45~942.59 resulting
in a NET INCOME FOR THE YE.AR of $1~242~197.19. In the year ended December 31, 1960, the District's statement shows total income from operations
to be $1,025,344.61 and total operating expenses of
$571,361.17, leaving a net income from operations of
$453~983.44 which~ when supplemented by tax revenue
of $625~523.20 and interest income of $66~039.65 and
reduced by an amo·unt of $33~096.08 for loss on abandonment of fixed assets~ res~ilted in a NET INCOME
FOR THE YEAR of $1~112A51..21. The correctness
of the foregoing statement was confirmed by the testimony of Hampton C. Godbe, Assistant Manager and
Treasurer of The .1\rietropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City. (R. 53-57). Mr. Godbe also testified that
said statement had been adopted by the Metropolitan
Water District as its statement. (R. 56). Although
Mr. Godbe resorted to vague and devious observations
that a tax levy was necessary and essential for the
operation, maintenance and administration of the District (R. 44, 58, 71-72) he finally admitted that the
District's income fron1 operations exceeded its operat-

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing expenses in 1959 and 1960 and that its entire tax

revenues created a surplus fund for those years. (R.
7'3, 76). He also testified that the District's total income
has been increasing constantly. (R. 67). It should also
be noted that the sales of water by the District to Salt
Lake City for the years 1959 and 1960 amounted to
$497,769.00 and $819,123.00 respectively, and for that
portion of 1961 up until October 16, such sales amounted
to $608,525.00. (Paragraph 13 of the Complaint as
admitted by Paragraph 13 of the answer, R. 3, 17.)
It is thus apparent that the sales of water by the District to Salt Lake City in 1959 and 1960 far exceed the
District's total operating expenses of $289,508.68 for
1959 and $571,361.17 for 1960 as shown on the StateInent of Income and Retained Revenues of the Metropolitan Water District at page 4 of Exhibit 3. It necessarily follows therefrom that the testimony of Mr.
Godbe that the sale price of water to Salt Lake City
is less than the District's cost of such water (R. 47) and
that portion of defendants' Finding of Fact No. 5 (R.
83) to the effect that the surplus funds of the District
are "derived*** from the sale of water to others than
Salt Lake City" are without basis in fact. As a matter
of fact the sales of water by the District to others than
Salt Lake City in 1959 amounted to only $362,777.80
and in 1960 amounted to only $131,691.70 (by subtracting sales to Salt Lake City from total water sales
for such years as shown on the Statement of Income and
Retained Revenue of the Metropolitan Water District
at page 4 of Exhibit 3) . And yet the District showed a
5
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Net Income from Operations of $584,344.39 for 1959
and $453,983.44 in 1960. It therefore becomes undisputed that both the net income from operations and the
cash surplus of the District consist chiefly of revenues
derived from the sale of water by the District to Salt
Lake City. And Mr. Godbe also testified that the water
sold to Salt Lake City by the District is a commodity
that is sold and delivered by it and when the sale is
consummated, the City is at liberty to do with the
water as it sees fit. (R. 27).
The Metropolitan Water District admits that it
has not credited the payments made by Salt Lake City
for water against taxes levied by the District (Paragraph 14 of the Complaint, R. 3, as admitted in Paragraph 14 of the Answer at R. 17; Finding of Fact No.
7, R. 84) and the Lower Court held, as a matter of law,
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to have such payments so credited. (Paragraph 5 of defendants' Conclusions of Law, R. 85, and Paragraph 2 of the Decree,

R. 88.)
Unlike all other municipal corporations or tax
supported institutions, the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City levies taxes not for expenditure
in the year for which they 'vere levied but for expenditure in subsequent years. Thus Mr. Godbe testified
that taxes levied in 1960 were actually used for operating expenses in 1961 (R. 57-59) and that the District
operated on reserve funds (~. 57) and does not issue
tax anticipation notes for operating capital. (R. 60).
He also testified that the District's income for 1961 had
6
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con1e frmn tax revenue, sale of water and interest earnings on investments ( ll. 59) and that such income was
not segregated into separate funds but was deposited
into one general fund. ( R. 44, 58, 71-73) .
In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Godbe testified
that the Metropolitan "\Vater District had many proposed projects relating to the acquisition, storage and
distribution of water resources which would cost many
n1illions of dollars. (R. 35-41). However, Mr. Godbe
testified that such proposals had not been submitted to
the voters of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City ( R. 60) and that the District does not plan
or intend to submit such proposals to said voters for
their affirmance or disaffirmance in the foreseeable
future. ( R. 67-70) . It necessarily follows therefrmn
that the defendant Metropolitan Water District of
Salt Lake City fully intends to charge the residents and
taxpayers of Salt I.Jake City such rates for water supplied to Salt Lake City as will, when augmented by
t~v revenues levied solely for the purpose of enlarging
existing cash surplu,ses ~ put the Board of Directors of
said District in a position of absolute control in determining the cost and need of capital outlays of the District without seeking the approval of the District's taxpaying voters as contemplated by the enabling statute
relating to the District's incurring indebtedness in excess of its ordinary annual income and revenue. Mr.
God be also testified that the Metropolitan Water District is under no contractual obligation to Salt Lake
City to provide such facilities. (R. 63).

7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE
PAYMENTS FOR WATER MADE BY SALT
LAKE CITY TO THE METROPOLITAN W ATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DEDUCTED FROM TAXES LEVIED BY THE
DISTRICT BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 73-8-43,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

POINT II.
'rHE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DOES NOT
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CREATING A CASH SURPLUS.
POINT III.
THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DOES NOT
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES IN
ONE FISCAL YEAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CARRYING ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE
DISTRICT FOR SUBSEQUENT F I S CAL
YEARS.

8
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POINT IV.
Tl-IE TAX LE,riED BY THE METROPOLIT.A.N \V .A.T}i~R DISTRICT OF SALT
LAKE CITY IN 1961 WAS INVALID.
POINT V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS.
POINT VI.
THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE GRANTED JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PRAYER OF THE COMPLAINT.

ARG-UMENT
POINT I.
APPELLAN-TS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE
PAYMENTS FOR WATER l\IIADE BY SALT
LAKE CITY TO THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DEDUCTED :FROM TAXES LEVIED BY THE
DISTRICT BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 73-8-43,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
The basic question involved is whether or not the
City is entitled to have all payn1ents for purchases of
water from the Metropolitan Water District applied

9
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to the reduction of taxes which would otherwise be
levied against the taxpayers of Salt Lake City under
the statutes relating to the Metropolitan Water District. The purpose of this brief is to demonstrate that
from the statutes involved no other construction can
reasonably be given except that such credit shall be
given for all payments made by cities to metropolitan
water districts for the purchase and delivery of water.
The crucial section in making such determination
Is Section 73-8-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and
especially the first four sentences thereof, which read_
as follows:
"Sec. 73-8-43. Cities, the areas of which are
included within metropolitan water districts incorporated hereunder, are hereby authorized to
pay to such districts, out of funds from the sale
of water or othed funds not appropriated to some
other use, such amounts as may be determined
upon by the govenning bodies, or other bodies,
boards, comn1issioners or officers having control
of such funds, thereof, respectively. Such payments may be made in avoidance of taxes as
herein provided, or otherwise_, and shall not be
deemed gratuitous or in the nature of gifts, but
shall be deerned payments for water or services
in connection with the distribution of water. Any
city making any such payment to any district
incorporated hereunder.. whether in avoidance of
taxes or otherwise_, shall receive credit therefor
and the amount of the payment so made by any
city shall be deducted from the amount of taxes
which would otherwise be levied against property
lying therein as herein provided. In the event

10
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that payment so 1nade by any city shall exceed
the mnount of taxes which would otherwise have
been levied against property within such city,
the mnount of such excess without interest shall
be carried over and applied in reduction of taxes
levied, or vvhich would otherwise have been levied
during the ensuing year or years. * * *" (Emphasis added) .
It will be noted that the above quoted section is
clear and unequivocal, especially the third sentence
wherein it is expressly provided that any city making
payment to any district shall receive credit therefor and
the amount of payment so made by any city shall be
deducted from taxes. It would seem elemental that
payn1ents for water by Salt Lake City to the Metropolitan Water District should "be deemed payments
for water" within the terminology of the above statute.
And it would also appear beyond dispute that payments for water by Salt Lake City to the Metropolitan
Water District would be from "funds not appropriated
to some other use" by the city.
It is the general rule of statutory construction that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their ordinary
acceptation and significance and the meaning commonly attributed to them. 50 A.m. Jur.~ Statutes~ Sec.
238; Emmertson v. State Tax Commission~ 93 U. 219,
72 P. 2d 467,113 A.L.R. 1174. And where the language
of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a
clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and
the court has no right to look for or impose another
11
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n1aening. 50 Am. Jur.~ Statutes~ Sec. 225; Sutherland~
Statutory Construction~ 3rd Edition_, Sec. 4502; Salt
Lake Union Stock Yards v. State Tax Commission~ 93
U. 166, 71 P. 2d 538. It is also uniformly held that a
statute will be construed so as to give it effect and meaning in preference to a construction which will render it
ineffective and meaningless. 50 Am. Ju.r.~ Statutes_, Sec.
357. In accordance with the above rules it is stated in
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 225, at pages 206-207, with
ample supporting authority as follows:
"In the case of * * * unambiguity, it is the
established policy of the courts to regard the
statute as meaning what it says and to avoid
giving it any other construction than that which
its words demand. The plain and obvious meaning of the language used is not only the safest
guide to follow in construing it, but it has been
presumed conclusively that the clear and explicit terms of a statute expresses the legislative
intention, so that such plain and obvious provisions must control. A plain and unambiguous
statute is to be applied and not interpreted,
since such a statute speaks for itself, and any
attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and
tends only to obscurity. * * * "
Thus, it is held that "any construction which contradicts
the letter of a statute should be carefully scrutinized,
and applied with caution and circumspection, lest the
judgment of the court be substituted for that of the
legislature." 50 Am. Jur.~ Statutes_, Sec. 241 and cases
therein cited. As was stated in .Jay v. Boyd~ 351 U. S.
345, 357, 100 L. Ed. 1242, 1254, 76 S. Ct. 919, 927
(1956):

12
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"llut we Inust adopt the plain meaning of a
statute, however severe the consequences."
l t should also be noted that Section 73-8-43, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, is not limited, as claimed by
th~ defendant, to payments made by the city in lieu of
taxes under Section 73-8-38, but it states that payments
Inade in that Inanner u or otherwisen shall be deemed
payments for water or services in connection with the
distribution of water. As stated above actual payments
for water made by Salt Lake City to the District would
certainly "be deemed payments for water" under the
statute and thereby qualify as a payment "otherwise"
than in lieu of taxes under Section 73-8-38. The above
section taken in connection with other provisions of the
.i\Ietropolitan vV ater District Act clearly evidences a
legislative intent that water districts can tax only when
they are unable to sell enough water to raise funds in
a sufficient amount to cover what they would otherwise receive in property taxes. In other words, property taxes are to be levied only in the event water sales
are less than the permissible levy of property taxes.
Therefore, as an exa1nple, if the Metropolitan Water
District of Salt Lake City is to levy taxes on the city's
residents, its sales to the city must be less than the 2y2
n1ill tax levy. In 1961 the 21;2 mill levy will net the
)letropolitan Water District approximately $639,000.
The city's payments to the Metropolitan Water District for 1960 and the first half of 1961 are over $650,000; consequently, the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan 'Yater District should have allowed a credit

13
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to the residents of Salt Lake City, under Section 738-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, prior to July 1,
1961, and not levied any taxes upon the taxpayers of
Salt Lake City for the calendar year 1961. This legislative intent that metropolitan water districts are to
be operated without benefit of taxation, insofar as possible, is evidenced in other sections of the Metropolitan
Water District Act. Section 73-8-31 provides that the
"Board of Directors shall fix such rates for water furnished as will, in conjunction with the proceeds of the
n1aintenance and operation tax authorized by Section
73-8-18 (i) above, pay the operating expenses of the
district, provide for repairs and depreciation of works
owned or operated by such district, pay the interest on
any bonded or other debt, and so far as practicable,
provide a sinking or other fund for the payment of the
principal of such debt as the same may become due;
it being the intention of this section to require the districts to pay the interest and principal of its indebtedness from the revenues of such district, so far as practicable."
The provisions of the law relating to taxing powers
are to be strictly construed, even in the case of water
districts. At least the decision of the Utah Supreme
Court, in the case of the Bou.ntif1tl Water Conservancy
District v. Board of Commissioners of Bountiful, 5
Utah 2d 142, 298 P. 2d 524, would seem to so indicate.
In that case the Supreme Court held that ambiguous
language relating to taxing authority would be resolved
against the taxing authority and in favor of the tax-

14
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payer, even where the public policy of water conservancy and sound water management is a factor in the
law suit. 'I' his is in accordance with the general rule
that tax laws are to be strictly construed against the
state and in favor of the taxpayer and, therefore, where
there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning of a revenue
statute it should be resolved in favor of those taxed.
Sutherland~ Statutory Construction~ 3rd Edition, Sec.
6701. In this case we do not even have the problem of
a "reasonable doubt" as to the meaning of the statute
in question. Its provisions are clear and unambiguous
and should be given effect in accordance with the foregoing authority.
It should also be noted that the construction of
Section 73-8-43 as contended for by the plaintiffs would
not affect the power of the District to levy taxes for
the retirement of its general obligation revenue bonds
under Section 73-8-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
which specifically requires that " (t) he full faith and
credit of the district shall be pledged to the payment
of its general obligation and general obligation revenue
bonds and taxes shall be levied * * * fully sufficient to
pay such part of the principal of and interest on general
obligation revenue bonds as the revenues of the district
pledged thereto may not be sufficient to meet." Furthermore, taxes levied to pay principal of and interest on
the bonds of the district are not subject to the limitation
of twenty-five cents on each one hundred dollars of the
assesed Yaluation of taxable property of the District
under the provisions of Section 73-8-18 (i), Utah Code

15
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Annotated, 1953. In connection with the above, it is
interesting to note that Mr. Godbe testified that the
District has never had to levy a special tax for the retirement of the eight million dollar bond issue authorized by the taxpayers of the District in 1958 for the
construction of the Little Cottonwood Water Treatment Plant and that it was not expected that it would
be necessary for the District to levy such a tax. (R.
48). Thus, it is apparent that the District has been
meeting its bonded indebtedness from the revenue of
the District and that it has accumulated over a. two million dollar surplus consisting in large part of the 2.5
mill general tax levy being questioned in this appeal in
spite of its bonded debt.

POINT II.
THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DOES NOT
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES FOR
THE PURPOSE OF CREATING A CASH SURPLUS.
Section 73-8-18 (i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
authorizes the Metropolitan Water Board to:
"levy and collect taxes for the purposes of
carrying on the operations, and paying the obligations of the district; * * * provided, however,
that taxes levied under this section for administering the district and operating its properties
shall not exceed twenty-five cents on each one
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hundred dollars of the assessed valuation of taxable property in the district. Taxes levied to pay
principal of and interest on the bonds of the
district, to pay indebtedness and interest thereon owed to the United States of America, or
to pay assessments or other amounts due any
water users' association or other entity, public
co-operative or private, from which the district
procures water_, shall not be subject to the foregoing limitation. * * * " (Emphasis added.)
An examination of the above statutory grant of
authority necessarily leads to the conclusion that no
power to levy that particular tax for the purpose of
creating a surplus for future operating expenses or
future acquisition of water rights was intended or included therein. Such a tax was intended solely "for administering the district and operating its properties"
-purely operational expenses for the taxing period
involved. To hold otherwise would render ineffective the
provisions of Section 73-8-22, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which provides as follows:
"Whenever the board of directors of any metropolitan water district incorporated under this
act shall, by ordinance * * * determine that the
interests of said district and the public interest
or necessity demand the acquisition, construction
or completion of any source of water supply,
water, waterworks or other improvement, works
or facility, or the making of any contract with
the United States or other persons or corporations, or the incurring of any preliminary expense, necessary or convenient to carry out the
objects or purposes of said district wherein an
indebtedness or obligation shall be created to sat-
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isfy which shall require a greater expenditure
than the ordinary annual income and revenue
of the district shall permit, said board of directors
may order the submission of the proposition of
incurring such obligation or bonded or other
indebtedness for the purposes set forth in the
said ordinance, to such qualified electors of such
district as shall have paid a property tax in the
year preceding such election, at an election held
for that purpose. * * * "
Section 73-8-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that, if the above election favors such a proposition, "the district shall thereupon be authorized to incur
such indebtedness or obligation."
In light of Mr. Godbe's testiinony that the District
contemplates a capital improvements program running
into millions of dollars but does not anticipate any need
to submit such proposed improvements to the electors
of the District, it becomes apparent that the controlling
body of the Metropolitan Water District intends to
perpetuate such a surplus from the sale of its water and
the imposition of the aforementioned general tax levy
upon the taxpayers of Salt Lake City that it thereby
acquires sole power to determine the needs of the District without permitting the people to voice their approval or disapproval of such projects. This is the type.
of centralization of power in bureaucratic bodies which
deprives the people of their basic freedoms and subjects
them to taxation without representation. It becomes
the more apparent when it is recognized that the governing body of the Metropolitan Water District is not
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au~werable

to its taxed subjects for its actions through
the process of elections.
It is clear that the authority vested in the ~Ietro
politan \Vater Board under the above statutes is limited
to levying taxes for administrative and operational
expenses within stated limits and to pay bonded indebtedness and any amounts a due~~ for the purchase of
water or water rights in addition thereto. Such tax
levies are limited to the fiscal years involved under Section 73-8-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. In the event
that expenditures in excess of current annual income are
deemed necessary for the acquisition of water or facilities, authority therefor must be obtained from the electorate as provided. There is no authority in the statutes
of this state which would allow the levy of taxes by the
l\Ietropolitan Water Board in anticipation of expenses
other than those conte1nplated for the particular fiscal
year for which the taxes are levied.

The authority contained in Section 73-8-18 ( m) ,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to "invest any surplus
money" in certain securities cannot be interpreted to
authorize the creation of surpluses by taxation contrary
to the express provisions of the statute in relation thereto. The above cited Section 73-8-18 (m) can relate only
to such surpluses as may be lawfully created through
the exercise of granted or implied powers, i.e., the surplus realized from the sale of water at rates established
by the District.
The powers of water districts are limited to those
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expressly granted by statute and also those necessarily
or fairly implied, or incident to the powers expressly
granted, or essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the water district. Section 73-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; Lehi City
v. Meiling~ 87 U. 237, 48 P.2d 530; 94 C.J.S.~ Waters,
sec. 243 ( 5) . And our Supreme Court has generally
adhered to a policy of strictly limiting the extension of
municipal powers by implication, particularly with respect to the extensiOn of tax powers. Moss v. Board of
Commissioners of Salt LJake City~ 1 U. 2d 60, 261 P.2d
961. This is the general rule, applicable to "quasi-municipal'' corporations. S1dherland_, Statutory Construction_, 3rd Edition, Sec. 6501; 37 Am. Jur._, Municipal
Corporations_, Sec. 6, p. 625, footnote 4. The court in
the Moss case declared the rule in this state to be as
follows, at page 964 of 261 P.2d:
"The City's power to tax is derived solely
from legislative enacbnent and it has only such
authority as is expressly conferred or necessarily
implied. This court has not favored the extension
of the powers of the city by implication (citing
cases) , and the only modification of such doctrine is where the power is one which is necessarily implied (citing cases). Unless this requirement is met_, the power cannot be deduced
from any con.fiideration of convenience or necessity_, or desirability of s11ch result_, and no doubtful inference from other powers granted or from
ambiguous or 11ncertain provisions of the law
would be su;fficient ot sustain such authoritlf."
(Emphasis added.)
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Certainly it cannot be said that the asserted right
to levy taxes to establish a surplus for future expenditures in excess of annual revenues can be implied from
a statute in abrogation of specific provisions therein
which expressly provide the means of acquiring funds
for such expenditures. Express provisions of statutes
prevail over any possible implied provisions which contradict them. 82 C.J.S.~ Statutes, Sec. 347, page 720.

POINT III.
TI-IE lVIETROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY DOES NOT
HA YE THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES IN
ONE FISCAL YEAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CARR-YING ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE
DISTRICT FOR SUBSEQUENT F I S CAL
YEARS.
Section 73-8-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
"On or before the 20th day of August the
board of directors of the district shall by resolution determine the amount of money necessary
to be raised by taxation during the fiscal year
beginning the 1st day of January next preceding
and shall fix the rate of taxation of the areas of
each separate city within the district, designating
the number of cents upon each one hundred dollars assessed valuation of taxable property in
each of said areas in each county and shall levy
a tax accordingly.
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" (a) Sufficient to meet interest and sinking
fund requirements on, and/or any payment to
principal of, outstanding bonded and other indebtedness of said district; * * * or on any contract or other indebtedness and
"(b) For all other district purposes." (Emphasis added.)
The above statute is clear and unambiguous. It permits only the levy of taxes for money necessary to the
conduct of the District's operations for the fiscal year
beginning on the preceding January 1st~ not for the
District's operations for any fiscal year subsequent to
the date of fixing the tax rate. As has been pointed out
under Point II, the power of the district to levy .a general tax under Section 73-8-18 (i), Utah CodeAnnotated, 1953, is limited to purposes of "administering
the district and maintaining and operating its properties." These, then, are the district purposes for which
the District's Board of Directors "shall fix the rate of
taxation" under Section 73-8-36 as above set forth.
And such purposes must relate to the fiscal year commencing on the preceding January I st. The levy of
taxes in one fiscal year by a tax supported unit of government for undetern1ined and speculative use in the
future is entirely foreign to our concept oof government
as well as being in direct conflict with statutory provisions as in this case. This is particularly egregious
where the practice would permit the accumulation of
large tax surpluses and thereby remove from the taxpayers their statutory right to determine the extraordinary capital needs of the District by vesting such
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power solely in the hands of a non-elected board of
directors.
In view of the authorities cited under Point I with
respect to the effect to be given plain, unambiguous
language in a statute, it would appear clearly beyond
dispute that the ~Ietropolitan V\T ater District of Salt
Lake City may not levy a general tax in one fiscal year
for expenditure by the District in the following or subsequent fiscal years. The fact that this was done in 1961
and previous years is undisputed.
POINT IV.
THE TAX LEVIED BY THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT
LAKE CITY IN 1961 WAS INVALID.
The plaintiffs incorporate herein the arguments
set forth under POINTS I, II and III.
POINT V.
THE LOWER COURT ERR.ED IN GRANTING JUDGMEN-T TO THE DEFENDANTS.
The plaintiffs incorporate herein the arguments set
forth under POINTS I, II and III.
POINT VI.
THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE GRANTED JLTDG)l~~NT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PRAYER OF THE COlVIPLAINT.
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The plaintiffs incorporate herein the arguments set
forth under POINTS I, II and III.

CONCLUSION
Regardless of the semantic smokescreen employed
by the defendant Metropolitan Water Board to obscure the real nature of its unappropriated cash surplus
accumulated during 1959 and 1960 from profits realized
from the sale of \Vater and taxes levied against the taxpayers of Salt Lake City, it is clear that its so-called
"emergency" or "reserve" fund in excess of two million
dollars was simply a cash surplus created in large part
by a "double tax" upon Salt Lake City's taxpayers.
This is so because such taxpayers must pay for water
consumed by them the same as the District's water
consumers outside the city and yet, in addition thereto,
are subjected to an ad valorem tax which swells a surplus already realized by the District through its sale
of water. Such a practice is contrary to the laws of the
State of Utah and in particular the tax levied by the
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City in 1961
was invalid for the following reasons: ( 1) Payments
for water made by Salt Lake City were not credited
against the tax levied by the District contrary to Section
73-8-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; (2) Said tax
was levied for the sole purpose of enlarging an existing
cash surplus realized by the District from the sale of
water thereby removing from the people, to the extent
of the tax revenue collected, their right to determine the
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need of capital expenditures made in excess of the District's ordinary income and revenue; and (3) It was
not levied for district purposes for the fiscal year 1961
contrary to Section 73-8-36, Utah Code Annotated,
1953.

For the above reasons the judgment of the lower
court should be reversed and plaintiffs should be granted
judgment in accordance with the relief sought in the
complaint.
Respectfully submitted,

HOMER HOLMGREN
Salt Lake City Attorney
JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorneys for Appellants
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